My research generally focuses on the metaphysics of intensional entities: properties, relations, states of affairs, and other things of that ilk. In a recent paper I develop an alternative (which I call ‘Ordinal Type Theory’) to the Simple Theory of Types that is commonly used in the context of higher-order metaphysics. I build on this in my forthcoming ‘Towards an Ontology of Roles and States’, in which I propose a conception of relations as sets of role sequences. The tentative upshot is an ontology in which there are no ‘complex’ entities other than states of affairs and roles:

In case you’d like a more interactive approach to my published work in metaphysics, here is a ‘shared artifact’ that I made with Claude Fable 5 (and subsequently modified) in June 2026:

The six papers in question are as follows:

There are two main strands running through most of these papers: first, the search for a satisfactory theory of intensional entities that can serve as a framework for further theorizing, metaphysical or otherwise; and second, the attempt to analyze certain concepts of metaphysical interest, in particular ones applicable to intensional entities. Both strands trace back to my PhD thesis.

LSPR presents a framework similar to the one used in that thesis, and the main idea behind its analysis of the concept of a logically simple property or relation is also already present there. IPR applies the same basic idea to the problem of analyzing the concept of intrinsicality, and uses essentially the same framework. However, it runs into certain problems (see in particular §6.3 of that paper), which already point in the direction of an approach that employs a ‘genuinely metaphysical’ notion (and not just ‘broadly logical’ notions in addition to a concept of parthood).

In QPR, the ‘broadly logical’ approach has finally been abandoned. This paper already cites OTT (despite having been published a few years earlier), in which the concept of fundamentality is taken as primitive, and which develops with the help of this concept a full account of how intensional entities are individuated. TORS, in turn, is based on OTT and to a lesser degree on QVMR. What makes QVMR relevant for TORS is mainly the fact that the former provides some historical background for—as well as a defense of—an at least broadly positionalistic approach to the metaphysics of relational states. However, the approach defended in QVMR is based on a triadic concept of ‘occupation’ (as in, ‘X occupies the position P in the state of affairs S’), whereas the approach of TORS is based on a dyadic concept of ‘resultance’, which links states of affairs to ‘role assignments’, i.e., generalized multisets of role–entity pairs.