Revises the framework of my 'Ordinal Type Theory' by incorporating a broadly positionalistic conception of relations. Properties are treated as a special case of roles, relations as sets of role sequences. (Click here for an interactive view of the concluding section’s diagram, and here for a visually more interesting version.)

Criticizes the Simple Theory of Types and develops an alternative framework, essentially keeping the ‘orders’ of Ramified Type Theory while discarding the more familiar ‘simple’ types. The framework also contains an account of how intensional entities (i.e., states of affairs, properties, and relations) are individuated. The concept of a fundamental entity plays a pivotal role.

Provides an overview of some problems in the metaphysics of relational states, mainly from a positionalistic perspective.

Distinguishes two concepts of qualitativeness (or ‘purity’): pure qualitativeness (roughly à la Carnap) and strict qualitativeness (roughly à la Carmichael). The penultimate section revisits Quine’s ‘Grades of Discriminability’.

Proposes an account of intrinsicality in ‘broadly logical’ terms, following the pattern of my ‘Logically Simple Properties and Relations’.

Develops a ‘broadly logical’ account of what it is for a property or relation (or state of affairs) to be logically simple. This is offered as a replacement for Lewis’s concept of a perfectly natural property or relation.

Introduces a distinction between three kinds of binding problem: the brain’s, the cognitive scientist’s, and the philosopher’s.